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Abstract: Across Latin America, conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), in which
governments pay poor families conditional on their children attending school, have
successfully increased enrollment and attendance rates. No empirical evidence supports
the need for costly conditionality, however, and I compare the effect of unconditional
remittances to the effect of CCTs to determine which more strongly influences
educational investment. I test the outcomes of school enrollment and attendance and find
that unconditional transfers more strongly impact enrollment, while conditional transfers
more strongly increase attendance.
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I. Introduction
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) are government safety net programs in
which poor families receive monthly cash transfers conditional on child school
attendance.1 By tying the cash to education and health outcomes, the government
theoretically achieves dual goals of relieving short-term poverty and investing in longterm human capital. Handa and Davis’s (2006) assertion that CCTs “have come to
dominate the social protection sector in Latin America” is beyond debate. Mexico was
the first of at least eight countries to use a CCT to pay poor, rural families a stipend so
long as they ensured that their kids enrolled in and attended school (Schultz 2006).
Families were required to take young children for health checkups and vaccinations, as
well as ensure enrollment in school and attendance of a minimum of 85% of available
school days. The monthly transfers, often worth 50% or more of a family’s budget,
reduced short-term poverty while serving as an investment in children’s human capital
(Schultz 2006). By 2004, Latin American governments were allocating over $5 billion
annually to these hybrid social safety net-human capital development programs (Caldés,
Coady & Maluccio 2006).
Despite this popularity, a recent cohort of studies highlights various forms of CCT
inefficiency as investments in human capital. Caldés, Coady and Maluccio (2006) show
that program administrative and condition monitoring costs represented 40% of the
Nicaraguan CCT’s budget, suggesting large cost-savings if conditions are not necessary.
In their study of CCTs, Sadoulet and de Janvry (2006) show that because different
families have different thresholds below which they cannot afford school, differentiating

1

Most CCTs, including the one in Nicaragua, also transfer cash conditional on doctor visits for children.
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transfer levels based on this threshold could save CCTs 11% of their budgets by ensuring
that they are not paying families whose children would attend school regardless.
Sadoulet and de Janvry’s proposed targeting adjustments would result in a
resource allocation in which each family receives exactly what it needs to enroll or invest
in attendance. They conclude that this type of efficiency is especially important in poor
countries like Nicaragua that face governmental budget constraints and extensive
poverty. Interestingly, Handa and Davis (2006) conclude that the need for conditions on
Latin American transfers has not been established empirically.
The objective of this paper is to perform an empirical test of Nicaragua’s CCT
panel data to establish the effect of the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) on education
relative to the effect of unconditional remittance income. I respond to Sadulet and de
Janvry’s (2006) distinction between the two goals of CCTs: to internalize positive
externalities associated with long-run continued attendance in school and reduction in
short-term poverty such that families can enroll their children in school. Hence, I test the
effects of unconditional and conditional transfers on both attendance and enrollment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature about
cash transfers, to situate this analysis in an empirical niche. Section III develops a
theoretical model to guide empirical analysis. Section IV summarizes and discusses the
Nicaraguan CCT data. Section V presents the empirical technique and discusses its
associated estimation issues. Section VI compares panel probit and tobit estimates of the
relative effects of conditional and unconditional transfers on education outcomes. Section
VII concludes.
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II. Previous Literature
Gammeltoft (2002) provides evidence that remittances are the least costly and
most prolific form of unconditional transfers in Latin America. Authors concur that both
types of transfer improve educational outcomes, with conditional cash transfers having
raised school enrollment and attendance rates unambiguously in CCT program countries
(see Schultz (2004); Hoddinott & Skoufias (2004); Skoufias & Parker (2001); Maluccio
& Flores (2006); Sridhar & Duffield (2006); Schady & Araujo (2008); Glewwe &
Kassouf (2009)). Remittances also improve education and they do so without the
presence of a condition (see Edwards & Ureta, 2003; Calero et al (2004); Malone
(2006)).
This dichotomy between the effectiveness of conditions relative to unconditional
transfers is the center of a debate about improving rural education outcomes. Studies
suggest that poor families in the developing world choose less-than-optimal amounts of
education for children, but they disagree about why. Inchauste (2000) shows that cash
transfers do not significantly improve schooling in Bolivia for women or indigenous
minorities, suggesting that constraints like geography, parental education and culture may
dominate pure liquidity constraints.
An opposing body of work shows that poor rural families respond to changes in
income with respect to education. Levison and Moe (1998) and Levison, Moe and Knaul
(2001) show this response with respect to non-market “shadow” wages of children, while
Rosenweig (1990), Brown and Park (2001), Lloyd et al. (2006) and Glewwe and Jacoby
(2004) show responsiveness to educational investment with respect to liquid income.
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In its recent study on CCTs, the World Bank (2009) outlines a different
theoretical debate about the necessity of conditions on cash transfers, centering on underinvestment in schooling. Educational investment may be below the private optimum if
parents and children underestimate the future returns to schooling. There may also be a
less-than-optimal social level of education if schooling can lead to positive social
externalities like civic engagement or lower crime. Internalizing these positive
externalities with subsidies and transfers may also be an important political tool to attract
popular support for publicly-funded social safety nets. In contrast, however, public cash
may have a steep opportunity cost if it is not invested in alternative public projects. The
World Bank ultimately concludes that market-driven economic growth is likely the best
poverty-reduction plan, but that public projects like CCTs may be a necessary
supplement. It does not provide empirical support for this claim.
Earlier studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence against CCTs and
unconditional transfers as tools for economic development. Cox and Jimenez (1990) find
that (unconditional) public transfers “crowd out” private cash. In the presence of such
transfers, the marginal value of each remittance diminishes, reducing migrants’ incentives
to remit at all. This “crowding out” effect may also eliminate improved credit markets
that result from the presence of remitted cash (Taylor 1999). Additionally, Martinelli and
Parker (2003) show theoretically that conditionally transferred cash can alter incentive
structures and result in an overinvestment in human capital. Parents suffer in the short run
as they allocate an inefficient level of resources to education, and children ultimately pay
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the cost as they receive lower bequests later in life. In these cases, allocating investment
money privately may result in a more efficient outcome.2
Additional studies provide evidence against the effectiveness of remittances in
improving educational outcomes. Chami et al. (2003) show with a panel from over 100
countries through 29 years that remittances are often countercyclical and do not go
toward economic development. Instead of sending money home that can be invested in
education, remitters only relieve temporary budget constraints during economic
downturns. In these cases, the targeted and intentional nature of CCTs may be needed to
achieve long-run gains in human capital.
The preceding discussion emphasizes the debate surrounding the value of
conditions on cash transfers as an educational investment. The following section develops
a theoretical model with which to apply this question to the Nicaraguan data.

III. Theoretical Model
Most CCT analysis papers include a set of general assumptions in place of a
formal model. A simple family-utility maximization framework effectively frames the
typical Nicaraguan family’s tradeoff between education and other consumption and
provides the basis for empirical analysis. This model assumes that the child’s only
opportunity cost of education is the value of her production in the home and that children
do earn such a shadow wage when not in school.3 The typical CCT’s condition requires
attendance of at least 85% of available days and I assume that families will not choose to
allocate more than the necessary number of days, since they face an opportunity cost of
2

It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that cash bequests are minimal or non-existent in rural
Nicaragua. Parents often bequest land to children but land likely doesn’t factor into schooling and
consumption decisions.
3
Levison and Moe (1998) demonstrate the empirical validity of this assumption.
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consumption. Decisions in this model flow from the assumption that families accurately
value the returns to a given level educational investment and that the future value of
education is worth a family’s present level of investment. This assumption likely does not
hold in reality and relaxing it will help explain this paper’s empirical results.
To see the relationship between the type of transfer – conditional or unconditional
– and education outcomes, consider two possible family resource allocation scenarios in
rural Nicaragua. The first suggests that an unconditional cash transfer regime is efficient
and the second suggests that a conditional regime is efficient. The first scenario, depicted
in Figure 1, illustrates a family that, along the first, pre-transfer, budget constraint,
initially allocates more heavily toward schooling than other consumption. This family
represents a typical unconditional-regime family in that it does not require conditions on
cash transfers to improve school attendance. The presence of an unconditional transfer
(remittance) shifts the budget constraint outward to the post-transfer constraint.4 The
difference in attendance levels between the unconditional allocation (utility curve 3) and
the level required by the condition (utility curve 2) is small. In this case the condition
itself does not induce a high increase in school and its cost may therefore be more
efficiently spent elsewhere.
Figure 2 illustrates the analogous case for a typical family that does not originally
allocate much school due to the non-liquidity constraints discussed in section I and
therefore requires conditions on transfers. These conditional transfers shift the budget
constraint outward to the post-transfer constraint. The dotted portion of the new budget
constraint is unattainable under the conditional regime that requires 85% attendance. The

4

This model assumes that remittances are equal in magnitude to the CCTs’ cash transfer; the RPS data
justify this assumption, as described in section III.
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difference in attendance between the unconditional and conditional equilibria in this
situation is large, suggesting that the conditions may be valuable in increasing school
attendance. There is also a significant potential drop in family utility (from utility curve 3
to utility curve 2) if the family is required to allocate more education than they otherwise
would. Taken together, these scenarios indicate that if the difference between the
conditional and unconditional outcomes is small, then investing in the program may not
be worthwhile, whereas if the difference is great, then investment in the program likely is
valuable. Analysis of a family’s enrollment decision would follow analogous reasoning.
The preceding discussion applies only to families who face some type of
constraint with respect to education. There are also families that do not face educational
constraints. The matrix in Table 1 includes these types of families. The top of the matrix
divides families among those that face constraints – the type in this analysis – and those
that do not. The left side of the matrix divides families by those who inherently value
education and those who do not. Hence, families in the upper left quadrant that face
constraints but do value education are the “typical unconditional regime” families that
only require an expansion of the budget constraint. Those in the lower left that face
constraints but do not inherently value education are the “typical conditional regime”
families discussed above. Families in the upper right who do not face constraints and
value education require no intervention. Finally, families in the lower right quadrant that
do not face constraints and also do not value education simply justify laws requiring
school attendance.
The prolificacy and success of CCTs at improving education for those families
that do face educational constraints in Latin America suggest a null hypothesis that
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families may face only liquidity constraints for education; the expected hypothesis is that
conditions will encourage families to respond to non-liquidity educational constraints that
unconditional transfers would not. The following guiding equations incorporate both
conditional transfers from the RPS program and unconditional remittances, as well as
other education-determinative controls for empirical estimation:
(1)

Attendanceit=f(RPS, remittancesit, Xit)

(2)

Enrollmentit=f(RPS, remittancesit, Xit)

The two regressions test conditional and unconditional cash transfers on the two primary
education outcome indicators, attendance and enrollment. Comparison of the magnitude
of conditional and unconditional transfers will suggest which more strongly impacts
attendance and enrollment. Enrollment is a binary variable and both enrollment and
attendance are indexed over time t and across students i, while X is a vector of
household- and person-specific control variables. Variables such as age, whether the
child works, grade and distance to school should have negative coefficients, since
increases in each should decrease the probability of enrollment and attendance in school.
The presence of the program or of remittances, as well as income, should increase school
attendance and enrollment. Theory does not unambiguously predict signs for child
gender, occupation and industry of the family. 5 The binary indicator farmer accounts for
differences arising for families for which agriculture is the primary income source.

IV. Data and Summary Statistics

5

Maluccio and Flores (2004) write the seminal analysis of RPS and do not indicate, specifically, which
controls they use. In his analysis of Progresa in Mexico, Schultz (2004) includes child age, gender, level of
parent education and distance to school. I include these, as well as other theoretically intuitive controls.
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Nicaragua’s RPS was allocated with randomized control and treatment groups
within the entire rural poor population to isolate the effects of intervention from any
“natural” improvement. The remittance recipients were not randomly assigned,
presenting a potential endogeneity bias since decisions about education and remittances
are likely made simultaneously. The dataset contains the necessary variables to measure
school achievement and remittances, as well as most theory-specified control variables.
RPS is the result of collaboration between the Nicaraguan government and the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), with World Bank funding. The first
sample was collected in 2000 before initiation of the program and post-treatment data
were collected in 2001 and 2002. The initial program covered 9750 people (1764
families) of whom 4920 were in the treatment group in 2000.6 The school transfer had an
annual value of US $112 and targeted children ages 7-13 who had not yet completed 4th
grade of primary school.7 All families in the treatment group also received a conditional
food subsidy transfer with an annual value of $224, regardless of their receipt of the
education transfer. There is therefore no way in these data to distinguish the education
transfer from the food transfer, making the effective conditional transfer $336 annually.8
For the typical rural Nicaraguan family, this represents nearly 20% of total expenditures.
The school-age population is nearly perfectly divided between the treatment and control
groups. All data are publically available on IFPRI’s website.9

6

Program attrition saw this number fall to 4774 by 2002.
I convert from Córdobas to dollars with September 2000 average Córdoba/dollar exchange rate of 12.80.
8
Maluccio and Flores (2006) identify this problem and make the same assumption about the value of the
conditional transfer.
9
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) makes available the Nicaragua data and other
publications related RPS on its website. http://www.ifpri.org/
7

11

Tables 2 through 4 present summary statistics for all estimated variables in all
years. Currency data are reported in year 2000 U.S. dollars relying on the 2000
Córdoba/dollar exchange rate of 12.83. In 2000, 59.7% of eligible students were enrolled
in school; by 2002 71.3% were enrolled. Attendance is measured as the number of school
days missed in the month prior to the survey, and for each year includes around 2000
individual children. This variable has strong right skew (see Figure 3); in 2000 63% had
perfect attendance and by 2002 81.2% missed no school. I therefore take the natural log
of the variable and rely on a tobit estimation technique to address this clustering (Figure
4). On average, in the baseline, the number of days missed is 2.92, and decreases as
expected to 1.31 and 1.15 in 2001 and 2002, respectively. For each year there are a
possible 22 days per month of school attendance.
The dataset records which families have members who have migrated, which
migrants send remittances, and how much they remit. This variable is heavily right
skewed, which potentially affects its comparison to the value of RPS’s conditional
transfers. The average annual remittance of the 807 people who lived in a remittancereceiving family is $309.27, close to the total value of the conditional transfer.10
Reflecting its skewness, the median annual remittance is $140.62 and the average annual
remittance after omitting 65 statistical outliers is $196.87.11 On average, however, the
magnitude of remittances is comparable to the conditional transfer.
Around 7000 people recorded that they worked in the week prior to each survey.
The binary indicator work used in all regressions incorporates both paid hours and work
defined as household production. Distance from school also explains attendance rates;
10

The average yearly remittance is $8.70 for the entire program population including those who received
no remittances.
11
I consider any observation greater than 1.5(75th percentile-25th percentile) + 75th percentile an outlier.
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this variable contains 2000 observations. The average student lives approximately one
kilometer from school. The average age of the RPS population increases from 21.14
years to only 22.14 over the panel’s three years, reflecting the fact that people are born
into and move and die out of the sample population. There are 50 percent women in the
sample.
The dataset does not measure family income, an important determinant of
resource allocation. Hence, I use total yearly expenditures as a proxy for family income,
under the assumption that private savings is minimal. In 2000, average yearly
expenditures were $1735.70 and did not change substantially over the life of the program.
The “farmer” dummy variable indicates that nearly 89% of all families worked primarily
in agriculture. Finally, I control for parent education level by including the maximum
level of education achieved by either parent in the family. This variable ranges from a
minimum of one year to a maximum of six, with a mean of just over four years.
Data Structure
Due to incompleteness of the dataset, several RPS variables required assumptions
and restructuring in order to assemble variables for estimation. The remittance variable
records the total amount of remittances received by each family from all relatives living
abroad. For each migrant who sent money, the original dataset records the remitted
amount and the period over which that amount was sent: semi-monthly, monthly,
trimester, semi-annually or annually. Since RPS was allocated on a monthly basis, I
normalized all remittance values to monthly transfers in order to match frequency
between independent variables of interest. I then summed all family remittances for each
household, to generate the final household monthly remittance variable. This sum also
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includes the monetary amount of all in-kind transfers. Therefore, each member of a given
family is recorded as receiving the same amount of remittances. I assume that families
with no recorded remittance income received no remittances and therefore replace
missing remittance values with zero.
The household parent education variable reflects the highest level of education
attained by either of the parents. The binary dependent variable enrollment is a
combination of all attendance data. That is, it is one for everyone who is recorded to
attend or has attendance records and zero for all school-age children who are recorded
under either the enrollment or attendance variables as not currently attending. Because
the dataset only records attendance data for the month prior to the survey it is a
potentially inaccurate representation of yearly attendance. Enrollment has more
observations than either attends or attendance because it aggregates both variables.

V. Empirical Approach
The theoretical model presented above suggests that it is the nature of a family’s
educational constraint that determines whether conditional or unconditional transfers
should have a greater affect on enrollment and attendance in school. The following
guiding equation will yield coefficients on remittances and RPS for comparison:

(3) Educational_Outcomeit = α0 + β0remittancesit + β1RPSit + β2lnexpenditureit + β3ageit +
β4genderit + β5distanceit + β6workit + β7parent_educationit + εit

In this equation i indexes individual children, t denotes years of the sample and εi is a
stochastic error term. Expenditure records the total annual value of a family’s
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expenditures as a proxy for (non-existent) income data. To estimate enrollment, equation
(3) will use a maximum likelihood panel probit estimator, presented with marginal effects
coefficients. To estimate attendance, equation (3) will use a panel tobit regression to
account for the fact that approximately 80% of all observations show perfect attendance
throughout the panel. As robustness checks I estimate the effect of remittances isolated to
the RPS control group and of CCTs with families who received no remittances, in order
to establish both transfer types’ “pure” effects.
Estimation Issues
In the RPS communities, decisions to fund migration and invest remittance
income in education are likely made simultaneously, or are both jointly determined by
unobserved variation. If a household decides to allocate resources to fund migration in
order to receive remittances, it may be with the intention of improving education
outcomes. This endogeneity will bias the coefficient estimates and likely over-predict the
effect of remittances on education.
To address this bias I estimate an instrumental proxy for remittances using the
concentration of families with a migrant in each community. This is the instrumental
variable approach in Acosta (2006). This migrant “network” effect should help new
people migrate and thus be highly correlated with remittance income. As a relative
concentration, however, it should not be inherently correlated with individual family
education decisions, thus mitigating the simultaneity. These instrumented observations
are potentially biased in themselves in that they contain the same households in the
regression, and that the neighborhood network effect may induce more migration for
education investment. Hausman endogeneity tests and Wald Chi-squared exogeneity tests
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with simple OLS estimators both suggest that remittances are endogenous with education
outcomes. Hence, I include the instrumented remittance observations in place of
remittances for both dependent variables. Equation five predicts the instrument:

(5) lnRemittancesi = α0 + β1lnexpendituresit + β2ageit + β3genderit + β4workit +
β5parent_educationit + β6Farmerit + β7PercentCommuityMigrantit + εit

where Percent Community Migrant is the excluded instrument used in all instrumental
regressions. Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the first
stage instrumental regression. In this regression, expenditures, the excluded instrument
and the level of parent education are all statistically significant in predicting the natural
log of remittances.
The sample of children who attend school is likely biased because it
systematically excludes students who do not enroll. The Heckman model adjusts for this
type of sample bias and ideally would be used in this analysis. Due to the way the
enrollment data are collected, however, there is no accurate method to censor the
attendance observations for a Heckman regression. Conclusions from attendance
regressions must therefore be interpreted in light of this potential bias.
There is no significant heteroskedasticity or colinearity between independent
variables (see Table 5 for pairwise correlation coefficients and Table 6 for Variance
Inflation Factor results). The regressions include household fixed effects and have a
relatively small horizon (three periods), indicating low risk of serial correlation or nonstationarity of the error terms.
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VI. Results
Transfer Effects on Enrollment
Sadulet and de Janvry (2006) believe that CCTs will have a stronger effect on
enrollment than attendance; families who have already decided to invest in school are
likely to continue doing so. Thus, the more important outcome is encouraging families to
invest for the first time. Hence, my primary estimation predicts enrollment as a function
of RPS and remittances.
Table 8 presents marginal effects coefficients of panel probit estimations for four
equations. Equation I predicts enrollment with RPS and the natural log of remittances to
show the effect of each in the presence of the other. Equation II incorporates the
instrumented variable in place of remittances; equations III and IV estimate enrollment
with RPS and instrumented remittances separately.
Interpretation of the natural log of remittances coefficients is as follows. A one
natural log-unit increase in remittances gives the corresponding coefficient’s percentage
increase in the likelihood of enrollment. Evaluated at the mean level of remittances, an
increase of one natural-log unit represents approximately $300, which happens to equal
the value of RPS’s transfer. This coincidence allows roughly direct comparison between
RPS and remittance coefficients.
Equation I predicts that remittances increase the likelihood of enrollment by 3.6%
when controlling for RPS, while conditional transfers increase the likelihood of
enrollment by 2.5%, controlling for remittances. Both variables’ coefficients are
significant at the one percent level. Eliminating the potential endogeneity in equation II
increases the marginal effect of RPS to 2.6% and increases the effect of remittances
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15.1%, both significant at one percent. Equations III and IV show that neither coefficient
changes significantly when not controlling for the other. These comparative results
indicate that unconditional transfers have a stronger effect on enrollment than conditional
transfers. In all regressions, if the child works his or her probability of enrolling is 54%
lower, significant at one percent. This strong effect is consistent with the theoretical
prediction that the opportunity cost of school is child work and that the two are
substitutes. In all regressions, all other coefficients are significant with the expected
signs, except for farmer. In rural Nicaragua 89% of all families are farmers, so its lack of
variation could explain its statistical insignificance.
Figure 5 plots cumulative density functions of the regression coefficients both
with RPS and without RPS against remittances. The distance between the two functions
shows the effect of RPS and their slope represents the effect of remittances. The two
functions are close together and strongly upward sloping, verifying the result that
unconditional transfers have a stronger effect than conditional transfers.
In the RPS population, 67.2% of all eligible students were enrolled in school. It is
tempting therefore to use this fact to create a “naïve” rule by which to test the predictions
of the probit model. Guessing randomly with no other information that every student is
enrolled in school would be successful 67.2% of the time, whereas the econometric
model predicts enrollment status correctly 78.7% of the time. The “fit” of the model is
78.7%, and it predicts enrollment 11.5% more accurately than a naïve guess.

Transfer Effects on Attendance
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The long-run goal of RPS is to invest in human capital; that is, to ensure that once
enrolled, students will stay in school. Table 9 presents a series of panel tobit regression
estimates of RPS on attendance. Equation V does not include a remittance coefficient in
order to establish the baseline effect of RPS on attendance. RPS is significant at the 1%
level and predicts that children in the program miss 2.5 fewer days of school than controlgroup children. The variables that record whether children work, are primarily in
agriculture and the level of parent education are all significant with expected signs. In
this model, age, gender and distance to school do not have a statistically significant effect
on attendance, though they do have signs in the expected directions with reasonable
coefficients. Increases in income predict lower school attendance, but this coefficient also
is not statistically different from zero.
Incorporating the natural log of remittances in equation VI as an explanatory
variable has no effect on the coefficients from equation V, and remittances are not
statistically significant. Equation VII incorporates the instrumented proxy of remittances.
This coefficient predicts that remittances raise attendance rates, but is not statistically
different than zero. Its presence does not meaningfully affect any other coefficients.
Equation VII estimates the effect of remittances not controlling for RPS, but this does not
qualitatively change remittances’ magnitude or level of significance.
Table 10 presents point estimates, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of
the differences between the RPS and remittance coefficients for each type of regression.
There is a statistically significant difference between the IV probit RPS and remittance
coefficient and the RPS and non-instrumented remittance coefficients in the tobit model.
The other regressions do not estimate statistically different coefficients.
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Robustness
To examine the results’ sensitivity to specification, I change the sample size to
include only observations effected by one type of transfer in order to identify the “pure”
effects of each. Table 11 presents these pure effects with subsets of the data that 1)
exclude RPS treatment observations, to isolate the effect of remittances; 2) exclude
observations that received remittances, to isolate RPS effects; and 3) include only
observations that received both conditional cash transfers and unconditional remittances.
The primary specification forms from the earlier regressions are used for each data
subset, including the instrumented remittance variable where possible and using panel
probit and tobit regressions as appropriate. The first pane of Table 9 presents effects on
enrollment and the second pane presents effects on attendance.
Isolated to the RPS control group, remittances improve the probability of
enrollment by 21.9%, significantly greater than other specifications. Other variables
remain significant at the 1% level and largely unchanged in magnitude. The coefficient
on work is again high, predicting that working children have a 55% lower chance of
enrolling in school. As in other specifications, remittances’ effect on attendance is
negligible and not statistically differentiable from zero. Eliminating observations that
receive remittances raises RPS’s effect on the probability of enrollment only slightly,
from 2.5% to 2.8%, significant at the 1% level. In the very small sample of 169
observations that received both conditional and unconditional transfers, no variables are
statistically different from zero. This likely reflects the small sample size of this subset.
Similarly, there are not enough observations to estimate a regression on
attendance using the observations that receive both types of transfers. In the sample
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excluding RPS treatment observations, remittances are again not statistically significant
in explaining attendance variation. Other coefficients also remain unchanged from the
original specification. Excluding observations that receive remittances raises the effect of
conditional transfers on attendance to 2.63%. These alternative specifications confirm
that the estimated coefficients are robust to changes in sample size and characteristics, as
well as functional forms.
VII. Conclusion
As expected, the RPS transfers have a positive, significant effect on enrollment
and attendance in school in rural Nicaragua. The data suggest, however, that
unconditional remittances actually encourage higher rates of enrollment than conditional
transfers. While there is no doubt that investing public money in human capital while
relieving temporary budget constraints is valuable, this paper supports Sadulet and de
Janvry’s (2006) conclusions that efficiency gains could be realized with unconditional
transfers.
For example, money saved from monitoring conditions on families with only
young, already-enrolled children could be focused more heavily on families with older
children who face a steeper opportunity cost to education. Alternatively, governments
could invest in means to facilitate migration and remittances, which also invest in human
capital and in some cases enhance rural credit markets.
These results should be interpreted with some care. The remittance data are
endogenous and, as discussed, the included instrumental variable is not free from
problems. For example, while the average remittance is similar in magnitude to the CCT,
its median value is much smaller. This discrepancy could help to explain the difference in
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remittances’ effect on enrollment but not attendance. It is also possible that because the
magnitude of remittances varies, it was their market-driven efficiency that resulted in a
higher impact. Or perhaps the primary education constraint is monetary but families
discount returns to continued education, making it easier to impact enrollment. Nicaragua
is also the second poorest country in Latin America, so results from its CCT should be
extrapolated with care. Rural poor populations in other countries may face entirely
different constraints to education. Though problematic, Mexico’s CCT provides a
potentially rich source to test these same hypotheses in a more developed nation with a
more robust CCT. Finally, it should be noted that CCTs and remittances represent purely
demand-side interventions in the rural education market. Due to poor and inconsistent
schools, it is possible that families appropriately discount returns to education and
improving education outcomes without improving school quality is less marginally
productive than other investments. Supply-side improvements may raise the value of
education sufficiently that demand-side interventions of much smaller magnitude are
needed.
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Tables

RPS
Enrollment
Attendance
Remittance
Expense
Age
Gender
Distance
Work
Farmer
Parent Ed.

Table 2: Summary Statistics 2000
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
9747
0.5
0.5
3444
0.60
0.49
2175
2.92
5.55
9747
8.44
93.39
9747
1731.64
1032.48
9736
21.14
18.13
9747
0.51
0.50
1777
1.02
3.41
7635
0.40
0.49
8731
0.89
0.31
7602
4.00
1.56

Min
0
0
0
0
133.74
0
0
0
0
0
1

Max
1
1
22
4000
6745.34
108
1
72
1
1
6

Variable
RPS
Enrollment
Attendance
Remittance
Expense
Age
Gender
Distance
Work
Farmer
Parent Ed.

Table 3: Summary Statistics 2001
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
9463
0.52
0.49
3282
0.71
0.45
2425
1.31
3.88
9463
9.81
139.67
9463
1623.53
940.27
9405
21.57
18.17
9463
0.51
0.50
2071
0.96
2.18
7221
0.36
0.48
7951
0.89
0.32
7824
4.03
1.56

Min
0
0
0
0
156.34
0
0
0
0
0
1

Max
1
1
22
4200
7448.45
110
1
49
1
1
6

Variable
RPS
Enrollment
Attendance
Remittance
Expense
Age
Gender
Distance
Work
Farmer
Parent Ed.

Table 4: Summary Statistics 2002
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
9482
0.5
0.5
3195
0.71
0.45
2380
1.15
3.87
9482
9.62
79.19
9482
1562.88
900.28
9429
22.14
18.09
9482
0.51
0.50
2017
0.90
2.43
7003
0.40
0.49
8141
0.91
0.29
8283
4.02
1.57

Min
0
0
0
0
147.31
0
0
0
0
0
1

Max
1
1
22
1200
7142.98
111
1
56
1
1
6

Variable
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RPS
Expense
Remittance
Age
Gender
Distance
Work
Farmer
Parent Ed.

RPS
1.00
0.15
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
-0.03
-0.03
0.00

Expense
1.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.09
0.22

Remittance
1.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.03

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients
Age
Gender
Distance
1.00
-0.02
1.00
0.54
0.00
0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.02
1.00
0.01
0.05
0.27
-0.01
0.02

Work
1.00
-0.02
0.00

Farmer
1.00
-0.09

Parent Ed.
1.00

29

Table 6: Variance Inflation Factors
Variable
VIF
1/VIF
work
1.15
0.87
age
1.1
0.91
lnexpense
1.07
0.93
gender
1.06
0.95
edparent
1.05
0.95
RPS
1.04
0.96
farmer
1.01
0.99
lnremittance
1.01
0.99
distancekm
1.00
1.00
Mean VIF
1.05

Table 7: Instrumented Remittances
Expenditures
0.036
(0.011)***
Age
0.001
(0.00)
Male
-0.006
(0.02)
Work
-0.004
(0.02)
Farmer
-0.026
(0.02)
Parent Education
0.027
(0.004)***
Percent Community Migrant
4.979
(0.151)***
Constant
-0.477
(0.113)***
Observations
15889
R-squared
0.07
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%
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Table 8: Covariate Effect on Enrollment
Probit
IV Probit
IV Probit
Probit
RPS
0.025
0.026
0.025
(0.015)*** (0.015)***
(0.015)***
Log Remittances
0.036
0.151
0.15
(0.009)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)***
Expenditures
0.09
0.083
0.086
0.091
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Age
-0.005
-0.005
-0.005
-0.005
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Male
0.091
0.091
0.092
0.09
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)***
Work
-0.536
-0.533
-0.536
-0.532
(0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)***
Farmer
0
0.008
0.003
-0.002
(-0.020)
(-0.021)
-0.02
-0.021
Parent Education
0.014
0.01
0.01
0.015
(0.005)*** (0.005)**
(0.005)**
(0.005)***
Constant
-3.028
-2.708
-2.785
-3.051
(0.530)*** (0.530)*** (0.529)*** (-0.528)***
Observations
6457
6457
6457
6457
Log-likelihood
-2950.721 -2946.719 -2948.294
-2959.498
Notes: All coefficients are marginal effects estimates across students and
through time. Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. **
Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. The non-instrumented regressions
have psuedo R2s of 0.116 and 0.114, respectively. RPS is 1 for treatment; 0
for control. Remittances are in log form. Distance does not vary
sufficiently across the dependent variable for regression. Total yearly
expenditures proxy family income. Work records whether the student
worked in the previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is
primarily in agriculture.
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Table 9: Covariate Effect on Attendance
Tobit
Tobit
Tobit IV
RPS
-2.500
-2.504
-2.510
(0.469)***
(0.468)***
(0.468)***
Log Remittances
0.247
-1.447
(0.260)
(1.063)
Expenditures
0.072
0.067
0.114
(0.439)
(0.439)
(0.440)
Age
0.082
0.083
0.074
(0.082)
(0.082)
(0.082)
Male
0.446
0.454
0.418
(0.474)
(0.474)
(0.474)
Distance to School
0.153
0.152
0.159
(0.077)*
(0.077)*
(0.077)**
Work
5.096
5.089
5.165
(0.816)***
(0.815)***
(0.817)***
Farmer
-2.991
-2.992
-2.994
(0.707)***
(0.707)***
(0.707)***
Parent Education
-0.314
-0.324
-0.259
(0.151)**
(0.152)**
(0.156)*
Constant
-5.243
-5.19
-5.567
(4.387)
(4.386)
(4.388)
Observations
4511
4511
4511

Tobit IV
-1.319
(1.058)
-0.244
-(0.439)
0.075
(0.08)
0.304
(0.477)
0.155
(0.078)*
5.326
(0.821)***
-2.872
(0.710)***
-0.23
0.16
-3.532
(4.411)
4511

Notes: All regressions are indexed across observations and through time.
Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. ***
Significant at 1%. RPS is 1 for treatment; 0 for control. Total yearly expenses
proxy family income. Work records whether the student worked in the
previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is primarily in
agriculture.
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Table 10: Lincom Tests Between Remittances and RPS
Coefficient
Standard Error
95% Conf. Int
Probit
0.05
(0.078)
(-0.104)- (0.203)
IV Probit
0.656
(0.151)**
(.269) - (.862)
Tobit
2.750
(0.538)**
(1.69) - (3.806)
IV Tobit
1.063
(1.151)
(-1.193) - (3.320)
Notes: The above statistics are point estimates, standard errors
and confidence intervals of the difference between remittance and
RPS coefficients for each type of regression. Starred standard
errors represent coefficients that are statistically different from
each other at the 5% confidence level.
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Table 11: "Pure" Effects Regressions
Enrollment
Attendance
Conditional
Conditional
Unconditional Conditional
Unconditional Conditional
and
and
Transfers
Transfers
Transfers
Transfers
Unconditional
Unconditional
Only
Only
Only
Only
Only
Transfers
RPS
0.028
0.000
-2.627
(0.015)*
(0.00)
(0.469)***
Remittances
0.219
0.000
-0.069
(0.054)***
(0.00)
(0.1.649)
Expenditures
0.063
0.094
0.000
1.183
0.156
(0.018)***
(0.012)***
(0.00)
(0.576)**
(0.44)
Age
-0.01
-0.005
0.000
0.183
0.039
(0.004)***
(0.002)***
(0.00)
(0.11)
(0.08)
Male
0.087
0.096
0.000
0.344
0.607
(0.026)***
(0.016)***
(0.00)
(0.68)
(0.47)
Distance
0.049
0.165
(0.107)**
(0.076)**
Work
-0.55
-0.548
-0.007
3.52
5.619
(0.043)***
(0.030)***
(0.02)
(1.113)***
(0.818)***
Farmer
-0.012
0.004
0.000
-1.655
-3.21
-(0.03)
-(0.02)
(0.00)
-(1.07)
(0.710)***
Parent Ed.
0.015
0.015
0.000
-0.484
-0.358
(0.034)*
(0.005)***
(0.00)
(-0.226)**
(0.151)*
Constant
-1.321
-3.134
-4.017
-17.42
-5.188
(0.749)*
(0.534)***
(7.27)
(5.711)***
-4.439
Observations
3211
6288
169
2116
4377
Notes: All regressions are across observations and through time. Probit regressions present marginal effects.
Standard Errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. RPS is 1 for
treatment; 0 for control. Total yearly expenses proxy family income. Work records whether the student worked
in the previous week. Farmer indicates if the student's family is primarily in agriculture. There were insufficient
observations to estimate the effects of both types of transfers only on attendance.
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